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Thomas J. Anton and Darrell M. West
Industrial policy has become an increasingly central focus ofpolitical debate as
American society struggles with new and troubling economic realities. Yet despite the
importance of this subject, little is known about how the public gains or processes
information on these matters, or about the evaluative standards used to judge
industrial-policy proposals. A recent referendum in Rhode Island offered a unique
opportunity to study these questions. Citizens participated directly in the debate over
new industrial policy by soundly rejecting the Greenhouse Compact, a novel and
comprehensive plan to "reindustrialize" Rhode Island. Here we report the results of a
public opinion survey conducted shortly after that referendum. We show that Rhode
Islanders rejected the Compact not because they felt the government had no legitimate
role in economic development, but because of uncertainty over the particular plan on
the ballot and dissatisfaction with the manner in which Greenhouse advocates
presented their plan to the public.
American state and local governments since 1980 have adopted an extraordinary
number of new economic development policies, ranging from assistance with
product marketing to the provision of venture capital. 1 Most of these innovations have
been promoted by politicians and officials, with little input from ordinary citizens. In
Rhode Island, however, officials insisted on obtaining public approval for an ambitious
economic development plan called the Greenhouse Compact. Put before the voters on
June 12, 1984, the plan was defeated by an overwhelming four-to-one margin. Not sur-
prisingly, many commentators have attempted to account for this unexpectedly decisive
rejection. Perhaps the most prominent analysis has been provided by Ira Magaziner,
himself the major author of the Greenhouse proposal. Magaziner suggests a variety of
factors that contributed to the referendum defeat but lays particular emphasis on voters'
lack of trust in the process that produced this ambitious plan. "All the analysts of poll
data," he writes, "all the postmortem discussions, and all the experiences of the 'cam-
paign' indicate that for most voters, the decision about the Greenhouse Compact ulti-
mately revolved around the issue of trust." 2
Thomas J. Anton is director of the A. Alfred Taubman Center for Public Policy and American Institutions,
and Darrel M. West is assistant professor ofpolitical science, at Brown University.
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In this article, we test Magaziner's assertion, using data derived from a survey of
1,001 Rhode Island citizens which was conducted immediately after the referendum.
Because our survey explored both the criteria used by citizens to evaluate the proposal
and the changing context within which those criteria were applied, we were able to
examine the conceptual underpinnings of "trust" in some detail. We were also able to
compare the significance of the trust issue with other plausible explanations of the
referendum outcome. Our analysis will suggest that while trust was assuredly an
important issue, both the substance of the plan itself and the dynamics of the campaign
were powerful influences on Rhode Island voters. The substance of the plan made
clear that the average voter had little to gain from its approval, and the dynamics of the
campaign aggravated citizens' fears that they were not well enough represented on a
commission dominated by the state's elite.
Studying Economic Development Referenda
The literature on tax and candidate elections suggests three broad classes of explana-
tions that may help account for voter reactions to the Greenhouse Compact. The first
is that calculations of economic well-being determine voter choices. According to eco-
nomic models, voters who perceive that the costs imposed on them by a given proposal
will be greater than the benefits they are likely to receive will vote against it, and those
who believe that the costs are less than the benefits will vote in favor of the proposal.
The apparently simple idea of economic well-being, however, can be defined in a
number of ways. Calculations of costs and benefits can operate at the personal, retro-
spective level and be defined as perceptions of past family economic circumstances.3
Or, they may operate at the personal, prospective level as perceptions of future family
economic status.4 Calculations of economic well-being also can focus on the larger
society and be measured through citizen perceptions of national economic conditions.5
Furthermore, a more narrow focus on tax consequences is conceivable; citizens may
evaluate industrial-policy proposals differently, depending on whether they expect their
taxes to go up or down.6 Self-interested models of vote choice, in short, can be opera-
tionalized in several ways. We shall see that the measure chosen can have important
consequences for the results achieved.
In contrast to economic models, political approaches assume that people bring more
to policy decisions than calculations about taxes or economic health. These broader
evaluations can be measured through a variety of indicators ; ideology, party identifica-
tions, interest in politics, trust in government, and views of the representativeness of
governmental institutions are among the indicators various scholars have suggested.7 For
example, if citizens do not trust government officials to do what is "right," or if they
believe that leaders are corrupt, these attitudes should influence citizens' evaluations of
policy proposals. Or, to cite an example that is relevant to the industrial-policy issue,
citizens' reactions to a Greenhouse Compact might well depend on whether they be-
lieve that government has a responsibility to create jobs for the unemployed.
A third model, derived from the literature on election campaigns, emphasizes the
effect of contextual factors on vote choice. This is a less deterministic and more
contingent perspective, because citizens' underlying attitudes and beliefs are not
regarded as decisive. Instead, this model focuses on events that occur during an elec-
toral campaign and that have implications for underlying attitudes, often reshaping
them to cause unexpected changes in final voter decisions. Attitudes obviously are not
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irrelevant in this framework, but their significance depends on how they interact with
events that unfold during the election campaign. To understand voter reactions to in-
dustrial-policy proposals from this perspective, therefore, it is essential to explore the
relationships between voter perceptions and the events that define the context within
which the proposals are developed, debated, and decided.
Questions derived from both the economic and political perspectives were included
in our questionnaire, as were standard demographic items. Meanwhile, the utility of
the contextual model was explored, using an analysis of voter decision making over
time and a documentary reconstruction of events. Let us now consider what each of
these models can tell us about the Rhode Island vote.
To begin with the economic and political explanations, table 1 reports Kendall Tau
correlations between the Greenhouse vote and several indicators derived from these
perspectives.8 Several interesting conclusions emerge from these figures. First, most of
the standard economic variables had weak relationships to the vote. For example,
regardless of whether perceptions of economic well-being are operationalized as per-
sonal or collective views, considered either retrospectively or prospectively, they were
not strongly linked to voting behavior. Perceptions of the Rhode Island economy last
Table 1













Rhode Island economy last year -.02
Rhode Island economy next year -.12*
Other state economies -.11*
Family last year . 14*
Family next year .06
Political Attitudes
Party identification .17*
Ideology .1 1 *
Trust in government .22*
Government corruption -.20*
Personal Impact
Compact helps me get better job .48*
Compact raises my taxes -.45*
Commission represents me .49*
Compact helps young stay in Rhode Island .62*
Source: 1984 Greenhouse Survey, conducted by Thomas J. Anton and Darrell M. West.
Note: The numbers reported here are Kendall Tau coefficients between the Greenhouse vote and selected
variables.
*Probability value less than or equal to .05.
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year had a barely visible correlation of —.02 with the vote. Perceptions of future per-
formance of the Rhode Island economy also showed a correlation of only — .12.9 Nor
did views about either past or future family economic health do much better. At a min-
imum, therefore, the Greenhouse Compact did not appear to have been a referendum
on the state of the overall Rhode Island economy or family financial well-being, at
least as conventionally measured.
Second, demographic characteristics also were remarkably unimportant in account-
ing for the vote. Gender was virtually unrelated to voting choice (Tau = .01), while
age, education, and income all exhibited relationships that were quite modest. Even
more surprising is the lack of relationship between employment status and support for
the Compact. The main goal of the Compact, repeatedly emphasized in printed matter
and media messages, was the creation of sixty thousand new jobs, for a work force
that had suffered above-average levels of unemployment. Yet among our respondents,
having been unemployed in the recent past had essentially nothing to do with the vote
cast (Tau = — .02). Membership in a union was more important, but only slightly,
leaving the impression that neither general perceptions of the economy nor individual
experiences with jobs or unions had much to do with voter responses to a job-creation
plan. Public employment, either at the state or local level, did play a role (—.16), but
even this figure was not very high.
Third, some of the standard political variables were related to the vote, although not
overwhelmingly so. Ideology had the weakest effect (.11), indicating a slight tendency
for liberals to have supported the Compact. Party identification (.17) exhibited a stronger
relationship, indicating that Democrats were slightly more likely to support the Green-
house Compact than were Republicans, but this magnitude was not especially impres-
sive. The items we adopted from the University of Michigan "trust in government"
scale showed stronger relationships to the vote, ranging from .22 for the trust-in-gov-
ernment scale to —.20 for the government corruption scale. 10 While these are not
unusually powerful correlations, we regard them as important because they attempt to
measure linkages between citizens and leaders. Such linkages are bound to be espe-
cially important in referenda of this kind, which present unfamiliar— and in this case,
complicated— issues to voters without providing them with the normal electoral cues,
such as those provided by candidates or political parties.
Our strongest results by far came with the last group of variables, which we have
labeled "personal impact" factors. These variables examined economic and political
perceptions of the Compact itself. We used two questions— impact of the Compact on
the job market and on taxes— that were explicitly economic in nature and one ques-
tion—the degree to which the Greenhouse commission (called the Strategic Devel-
opment Commission, or SDC) represented citizens— that was explicitly political. The
final question in this group— whether the Compact would help young people stay in
Rhode Island— was more ambiguous in meaning, as we discuss below.
These personal-impact variables allow one to examine more precisely the relation-
ship between vote choice and perceptions of the SDC and the Compact, and the results
are instructive. 11 The correlation, for example, between the vote and citizen responses
to the question "Do you think that people like you were represented on the Green-
house Compact Commission?" was .49, and therefore underlies the crucial significance
of the representation issue in the ambiguous political circumstances of an economic
development referendum. It also makes clear that many Rhode Islanders voted against
the Compact because "people like them" were not among the elites appointed to the
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commission. To voters confronted by a complicated plan that was prepared by an agency
consciously set apart from ordinary people, the most intelligible cue available appears
to have been the representativeness of the commission itself.
That perceptions were important to voters is made clear not only by the representa-
tion variable, but also by the items concerning jobs and taxes. We examined percep-
tions of the employment impact and the tax issue by asking respondents whether the
Compact would have improved their job prospects and whether it would have raised
their taxes. The strength of these relationships (Tau = .48 and -.45, respectively)
suggests the presence of a clear economic component in voter decisions. Virtually all
respondents (93 percent) thought the Compact would have increased their taxes, but
fewer than 20 percent thought they would have benefited personally in general had the
Compact been approved, and only 25 percent believed the Compact would have im-
proved their chances of getting a better job. For Rhode Island voters, in short, the
Greenhouse Compact was viewed primarily not as the comprehensive economic devel-
opment plan its promoters proclaimed, but simply as another large-scale spending
program for which they would have to pay but from which they would gain little
benefit. If the typical government-spending proposal seeks to persuade voters that they
can get something for nothing, this one sought approval for a plan that appeared to
give voters nothing for something.12 And that something was their tax dollars.
The obvious strength of this interpretation supports a similar view of the single most
powerful correlation reported in table 1, between vote cast and voters' views of the
capacity of the Compact to help young people stay in Rhode Island. Public interest in
this issue emerged early in the public debate over the Compact and became a promi-
nent theme in the media campaign organized by Compact supporters. The relationship
between support for the Compact and a belief that it would keep young people in the
state was very strong in our sample (Tau = .62) , which we interpret as the expectation
that the plan would have helped create jobs for youthful relatives of respondents. It is
entirely possible, of course, that respondents may have had other views in mind when
answering this question. They may have thought, for example, that the Compact would
have promoted economic well-being for the state as a whole, thus helping to keep
young people in the state. Or they may have believed that the plan would have been
socially useful in keeping families together. Unfortunately, we were unable to resolve
all of the ambiguities arising from responses to this question; thus, we accept the pos-
sible validity of differing interpretations.
These measures take us some distance toward understanding the structure of voter de-
cision making on the Greenhouse Compact, but they remain no more than suggestive
when expressed as simple correlations. To extend the analysis, we developed multivari-
ate models, taking advantage of the information presented in table 1 to exclude the dem-
ographic and economic well-being measures that seemed unrelated to the vote, but in-
cluding certain political variables that should, in theory, have been related to voter
choice, as well as the important personal-impact variables. Two statistical approaches
were used to study these relationships: regression and probit analysis.13 Regression of-
fers the virtue of clarity. It allows us to observe the strength as well as the direction of
relationships between variables and clarifies the relative power of alternative explana-
tions. However, because regression rests on various assumptions— such as interval mea-
surements and a "normal" distribution— we also used probit analysis to confirm our re-
gression results. Although probit estimates lack the simple interpretations of regression
techniques, their utility in the analysis of categorical data recommends their use.
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Table 2 shows that regardless of the statistical approach used, the results are quite
similar. Such traditional political variables as ideological beliefs and political trust
show little explanatory power. The variables that clearly demonstrate explanatory
power in this analysis, as in the earlier correlation analysis, are those we have labeled
personal impact. Among the personal impact variables, though, it is interesting that
neither the tax increase nor the job betterment items contribute as much to explaining
the vote as do the remaining two variables. This suggests that despite the overwhelming
expectation that taxes would have increased had the Compact passed, the tax issue was
not the most important source of the voting decision. The significance of citizens' mis-
trust of the elite underlines the crucial importance of the representation variable, which
emerges both in the regression and probit analysis as second only to the "helps young
people stay in Rhode Island" variable in its explanatory power. Since commissioners
were appointed rather than elected, normal sources of electoral accountability could
not be called into play in the event of public dissatisfaction with commission activities.
And since the members of the SDC were drawn almost entirely from the well-edu-
cated, highly paid bureaucratic and technical elites whose experiences were vastly
different from those of the average Rhode Island worker, it clearly was easy to doubt
that such individuals could be sensitive to the average citizen's interests in developing
strategies for spending tax dollars contributed by citizens. In the absence of formalized
political representation, Rhode Island voters appear to have followed a theory of literal
representation: those who are not like me cannot know, encourage, or protect my
interests.
Table 2















Compact helps me get better job
Compact raises my taxes









R 2 t .58
Source: 1984 Greenhouse Survey, conducted by Thomas J. Anton and Darrell M. West.
Note: The figures reported here are unstandardized regression coefficients. Coefficients marked with an
asterisk were at least twice the size of their standard errors, and thereby were significant at the .05 level.
tR 2 refers to the total explanatory power of the model. In this model, it explains 58 percent of the variance in
the vote.
*Probability value less than or equal to .05.
We are now in a position to better understand the structure of the June 12 vote and
thus the politics of this effort at economic planning. To begin with, the vote was not a
reflection of citizens' beliefs about the state of the Rhode Island economy or the state
of family financial well-being, considered either retrospectively or prospectively. While
voters assuredly had such views, we have shown that those views had little to do with
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the votes they cast in the referendum. In addition, the vote was not much affected by
partisan considerations. Republicans and Democrats were found on both sides of the
issue, and the slight tendency for Democrats to react more favorably to the plan seems
far less significant than other factors. What, then, was the vote all about?
The data reviewed here make clear, we think, that the June 12 referendum was pre-
eminently a vote based on calculations of personal impact, in a context that forced
voters to adopt a literal theory of representation which all but guaranteed a large nega-
tive vote. Almost all voters believed that the Compact would raise their taxes. A few
who believed that those taxes would help to create new jobs and who did not object to
the representativeness of the SDC voted for the Greenhouse plan. The great majority
of voters, however, thought that paying higher taxes would do little or nothing for them
or their relatives and would instead provide additional resources for the groups repre-
sented on the commission to squander on themselves. To the extent that the June 12
vote was a public-policy decision, it was a vote against higher taxes. To the extent that
the referendum was a commentary on the political process, the vote was a thorough
repudiation of the elite that had developed and promoted the plan. To the extent that
the vote was a commentary on Rhode Island politics in general, it was a massive affir-
mation of the status quo.
The Dynamic Dimensions of Voter Decision Making
We have treated the Greenhouse Compact referendum to this point as though it were a
single event that occurred on June 12, 1984. Although technically it is true that the
votes were cast on that day only, intense public debate over the merits of the plan
began in November 1983, when the plan was made public, and continued unabated
through the election. During this period of nearly eight months, voters had many
opportunities to make up their minds, and they did so at different times. From a voter's
point of view, therefore, there were many elections, not one. A large group of voters
(27 percent) made up their minds as soon as the plan was released; a decisional lull
then followed for several months as voters contemplated the debate; and decisional
activity reached its peak in the month preceding the vote, when most voters (55
percent) made up their minds, including the 26 percent who decided in the last week
alone.14 This variation in the timing of voter choice suggests an extremely volatile
electorate and reflects an uncertainty for many people that was not resolved until the
very last minute.
One ideally would prefer a panel survey— in which a sample of voters is reinter-
viewed several times during a campaign— to investigate campaign dynamics. But short
of that research design, it is possible to conduct a preliminary analysis of short-term
electoral forces using our question regarding time of decision. Table 3, on the next
page, examines the differential impact of economic and political forces during the
campaign by breaking down our earlier regression model by the time at which citizens
made their vote decision.15 The results are interesting because they show the varying
importance of economic and political variables in the model, depending on what was
going on during the campaign. For example, the tax variable contributed a good deal
to the explanation of voter decisions early in the campaign but contributed virtually
nothing a month before the vote and only a modest amount at the very end. Similarly,
party identification was important among early, but not late, deciders. The political
representation factor, finally, was important throughout the campaign, but it also was
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the only variable that reached statistical significance during the critical period of one
to two weeks before the election (for reasons which we outline below).
Table 3
Regression Model by Time of Decision on Greenhouse Vote
Last 1-2 2-4 1-3 3+
Variable Week Weeks Weeks Months Months
Ideology -.00018 -.051 .046 -.043 .020
Trust in government -.00098 .043 -.108 .041 .082
Party identification .00003 .069 .077* .051* .040*
Government corruption .016 .093 -.037 .017 -.0010
Commission represents me .253* .310* .291* .257* .307*
Compact helps young people
stay in Rhode Island .291* .106 .199* .135* .147*
Compact helps me get
better job .059 .011 .231* .069 .093*
Compact raises my taxes -.104 -.121 .016 -.237* -.145*
R 2 t .43 .56 .71 .73 .75
Source: 1984 Greenhouse Survey, conducted by Thomas J. Anton and Darrell M. West.
Note: The figures reported here are unstandardized regression coefficients. Coefficients marked with an
asterisk were at least twice the size of their standard errors, and thereby were significant at the .05 level.
tR 2 refers to the total explanatory power of the model; the .43 in the "Last Week" column, for example,
means that the model explains 43 percent of the variance in the vote for those who made up their minds
during the last week of the campaign.
*Probability value less than or equal to .05.
There are two reasons related to campaign dynamics which seem to account for the
varying effects of economic self-interest and political representation: short-term
political developments and the composition of the electorate at each decision point.
Short-term electoral forces were an important part of the decisional calculation by
voters. Although the SDC insisted that its activities were "above politics" and that it
had successfully brought all major sectors of the Rhode Island economy into agreement
on its nonpolitical plan, in fact many sectors— such as small business, women, and
blacks— felt left out and were determined to appeal to the political process. There thus
was no way the commission could avoid the political arena. Though enabling legisla-
tion for the referendum had passed both chambers of the state legislature easily, few
legislators felt strongly committed. Most were negative toward the legislation but voted
for it because it allowed the public to make a choice that the legislators were reluctant
to make themselves. The House Speaker and Senate majority leader were instrumental
in securing this outcome and, in return, achieved commission agreement that they
would each appoint three of the members of the new commission— if the referendum
passed.
In late May, slightly more than two weeks before the referendum, both the Speaker
and the majority leader announced that they planned to appoint themselves to the new
agency. The Republican candidate for governor immediately announced his outrage
over the absence of Republicans among these appointments by Democratic leaders and
warned that his earlier support for the Compact had been shaken. After several days of
well-publicized bickering between Republican and Democratic partisans, a solution of
sorts was reached. The commission membership would be expanded by two in order to
allow the Republican minority leadership in each house to appoint one commission
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member. This agreement, announced just nine days before the vote, seemed to many to
be a solution worse than the original problem, since the new agency would become even
more, rather than less, political in composition. Whatever the status of the old Strategic
Development Commission had been, the new agency clearly would be viewed as a pre-
dominantly political group.
It is not difficult in retrospect to understand why voters who made their decisions
during the one to two weeks before the election were so overwhelmingly opposed to the
Compact. A commission that had ballyhooed its experience and expertise had offered an
image of the state's economy that was contradicted by growing employment. A commis-
sion that had believed its efforts to be above politics had become enmeshed in politics.
A commission that had promised objective decisions had delivered appointments that
hinted strongly of back-room deals, cut in the old-fashioned ways by people who were
obviously unlikely to have much concern for the interests of the average citizen. And if
there was so much controversy and deal making now, how could voters expect that fu-
ture activities of a new commission would be any different? Virtually everything about
the events of late May and early June strongly suggested the emergence of an "old pol-
itics" that seemed antithetical to the new policies called for in the original Greenhouse
plan. Campaign dynamics, therefore, were instrumental in bringing the political repre-
sentation factor to the forefront in the weeks just before the election and in limiting the
impact of economic self-interest.
In addition, the role of economic and political forces during the campaign shifted,
because different types of voters made up their minds during various stages of the cam-
paign. Table 4, on the next page, offers a brief profile of three groups of voters: those
who made up their minds early (three months or more prior to the referendum), those
who made up their minds in the second week before the vote, and those who made
their decisions during the last week of the campaign. These three electorates were
chosen not simply because of the demographic and attitudinal differences portrayed in
the table, but also because they made very different decisions. Bearing in mind that
our sample of respondents slightly overrepresented Compact supporters, the percent-
ages of voters in these groups who opposed the Compact were 76.0, 88.5, and 65.5,
respectively. More than three-quarters of the early deciders opposed the Compact, but
virtually all of those who made up their minds in the second week before the referen-
dum turned against it, as support for the plan all but disappeared. This precipitous
drop was followed, however, by a recovery of support that produced in our sample the
largest margin of support for the Compact of any week in the campaign. Both voter
volatility and powerful influences on voter choices are clearly documented by these
figures.
Reading down the columns of table 4 offers some insight into the forces at play. The
early deciders were dominated by middle-aged, upper-income individuals; were more
likely than voters in either of the other two categories to declare themselves Republi-
cans; were largely opposed to government intervention in the economy; and were no-
ticeably more cynical about government honesty and effectiveness. Since they were also
readers, gaining most of their information from the Providence Journal-Bulletin, it
seems appropriate to characterize these early deciders as informed ideologues of pre-
dominantly moderate-to-conservative political opinions. Their profile contrasts most
sharply with the group that came to a decision in the second week before the referen-
dum. This "late electorate" was older, less prosperous, less well educated, less cynical
about government, and much more Democratic than the early deciders. They were also
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much more likely to be "watchers" and "listeners" than readers, with both television
and radio approaching the newspaper as their main source of information about the
Compact. Given their ideological conservatism as well as the prominence of Democratic
party adherence, it seems plausible to view this grouping as largely made up of the
conservative Democrats who often are found in working-class communities.
Table 4
Three Electorates, Three Elections: Characteristics by Time of Choice
Time of Decision Prior to Referendum
(numbers in %)






Age: % 65+ 19.4 26.9 23.6
% College-educated 49.6 37.9 50.0



















Government should create jobs 18.8* 24.2 28.7*




Source: 1984 Greenhouse Survey, conducted by Thomas J. Anton and Darrell M. West.
*Categories whose differences were significant at the .05 level.
The "last minute" electorate, whose members finally made up their minds during
the week before the vote, differed from the early and late deciders in several important
respects. Somewhat older and considerably less prosperous than the early ideologues,
they were more liberal and far better educated, and very nearly as Democratic in their
party allegiances, as citizens who had made their decisions a week earlier. They were
also less cynical about government than either of the other electorates, and were more
willing to accept the legitimacy of government job-creation programs. Since the last-
minute deciders were more likely to be readers than either watchers or listeners, we
are inclined to think of them as informed ideologues of moderate-to-liberal political
views, often associated with the more liberal elements of the Democratic party.
These different electorates and their varied preferences offer insight into the electoral
dynamics at play in the Greenhouse referendum. A fairly large bloc of voters made up
their minds shortly after the Compact was made public, grounding their choices in the
predominantly conservative ideologies associated with well-educated, upper-income
people. As enabling legislation for the referendum was introduced and debated in the
legislature, a small but steady stream of voters came to their decisions through the
weeks of winter and early spring; but not until two weeks before the vote did another
large bloc of voters come to their conclusions, which were more overwhelmingly
82
negative than at any other time during the campaign. This late electorate seems some-
what paradoxical, since it was far more Democratic than Republican (38.3 to 8.3 per-
cent) and far less cynical about government action than the early deciders, yet it was far
and away the least supportive of the Compact. The move toward a less cynical, more
supportive electorate culminated in the last week of the campaign, when another large
bloc of voters made more positive choices than had been made in any other time peri-
od. It appears, then, that the largely negative early electorate was followed by groups of
voters who had some difficulty making up their minds until two weeks before the vote,
when the electorate turned almost wholly negative. The recovery of support in the final
week was substantial, but not nearly enough so to create an electorate that came any-
where close to majority support for the Compact.
In summary, economic and political factors played varying roles as the Greenhouse
campaign unfolded. Yet these variations were not random fluctuations; they instead
appear to have been related to short-term dynamics within the campaign. When tax
talk was dominating the debate, economic factors played a major role in voter decision
making; when representational issues were paramount, political factors rose to the
forefront. It thus seems clear that economic and political forces both were important
during the Greenhouse debate but that their relative importance varied, depending on
short-term campaign dynamics.
Conclusions
We began this exploration as a test of Magaziner's belief that trust was the dominant
issue in explaining the failure of the Greenhouse Compact to win popular support. We
can now conclude that Magaziner was only partially correct. Although trust was in-
deed an important factor in the Greenhouse vote, other factors were even more impor-
tant, particularly perceptions of personal impact of the plan and concern over repre-
sentation. The clear significance of such factors seems sufficiently interesting to war-
rant a final commentary on issues raised in the Greenhouse Compact debate which are
important not only for Rhode Island but for the nation as a whole.
It is clear, to begin with, that the decisive rejection of the Greenhouse Compact by
Rhode Island voters was not a product of deep-seated (and therefore unalterable) eco-
nomic or political attitudes. As seems true in other states, Rhode Island voters gener-
ally supported government efforts to stimulate economic growth and did not reject the
Compact as an unwarranted intrusion of government into the private sector. Nor did
they oppose the plan because of a general mistrust in government (which was high),
party identification, or some other stable quality of public opinion. Rather, their oppo-
sition was founded almost entirely on perceptions of the plan itself. Most voters be-
lieved that the Compact would raise their taxes but provide little or no benefit to them
in return. The firmness of this belief, in turn, was based on their thoroughgoing mis-
trust of the financial and political elite that had formulated the plan, with no perceived
representation of the average citizen's interests, through processes that strongly suggest-
ed political deals that were designed to further enrich that tiny elite. These were short-
term perceptions associated with a specific proposal from a specific group which easily
could have been different if the plan had been presented and promoted differently.
If these data thus affirm the experience of other states that have held successful
referenda, they also suggest the risks inherent in pursuing a "sectoral" approach. A
planning group chosen to represent economic sectors rather than political constituen-
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cies runs the risk of being cut off from those constituencies. The Strategic Develop-
ment Commission in Rhode Island may well have included some of the best and bright-
est among the state's institutional elite, but when push came to shove, no one in the
legislature worked hard to mobilize support for the commission's plan, no candidate
for major state or local office worked hard for the plan, and even the governor seemed
little more than a halfhearted supporter at the end. Borrowing from a European
corporatist model, several institutions pursued their own mobilization efforts: banks
and insurance companies inserted leaflets in their monthly statements encouraging
citizens to vote; some colleges and universities did the same; and some businesses
inserted similar leaflets in their monthly bills to customers. Although we have no data
on voter reactions to such efforts, suspicion of the commission elite had become so
powerful by the time of the referendum that these efforts probably did no more than
increase voter resentment of the plan and its sponsors. In American politics, operating
outside the established political institutional structure can be a two-edged sword.
The risks inherent in a sectoral strategy are magnified if public participation in
economic planning is sought. Having insisted on a public referendum on its plan, the
SDC was obliged to give some consideration to how the plan might best be presented
to a mass audience. But its treatment of this issue must be regarded as inadequate at
best. Defying recent political experience from across the country as well as in Rhode
Island, the commission proposed a tax increase to partially fund the Compact. And to
make matters worse, it suggested programs so complicated that virtually no one could
understand them. The twin effects were to give opponents an easily understood nega-
tive label to pin on the program— that this was a tax increase— while denying to
proponents any opportunity to defend the Compact in terms that could be understood.
From the beginning, therefore, the commission lost control over the most fundamental
component of an electoral campaign, namely, definition of the issue. The commission
announced a plan to create jobs or stimulate economic growth, but voters heard a plan
to increase taxes. And, as we have shown, a substantial number of voters made up
their minds as soon as they heard that message. Although the tax increase was later
eliminated by the legislature, the image remained attached to the Compact and contrib-
uted to its defeat.
Unable to define the issue, the commission lost control of the dynamics of the cam-
paign. Under normal electoral conditions, when candidates are competing for an of-
fice, the goal is to secure core supporters early in the campaign and then pursue the
undecided voters. The efforts of the Strategic Development Commission very nearly
reversed this process, producing a core group of opponents early in the campaign and
failing to establish a base of support until the very last minute. As our analysis of the
three electorates has shown, the voters who disproportionately comprised the last-
minute deciders were those who supported government job-creation efforts; believed
that those efforts could be effective; were less likely to believe that the government
wasted taxes or was corrupt; were more trusting of government; and were less likely to
think that the government represented only big interests. These individuals were the
natural base for the Greenhouse Compact, yet their doubts or confusion prevented
them from joining the Greenhouse coalition early in the campaign. In effect, there
never was a core group of voter supporters for the Compact.
These dynamics were important because, unlike candidate elections, referenda are
"low information" contests, in which voters generally know little about the issues on
the ballot and often have difficulty evaluating the proposals. If traditional political
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elites (that is, elected officeholders) and traditional political factors (partisanship and
ideology) do not emerge to provide much-needed cues for citizens, short-term voter
perceptions of the plan and the way in which the campaign is conducted will dominate
the election. Apart from the governor, whose support visibly weakened as the cam-
paign wore on, no statewide officeholder emerged to champion the plan. Party labels
could not easily be attached to the proposal, since neither party took a formal position
on the Compact itself. Most of the commissioners were not in public life, and those
who were deliberately refrained from partisan appeals. Absent these typical clues to
interpret commission motives, voters gradually concluded that the commission repre-
sented nothing more than the interests of the financial and corporate elite that had
formulated the plan.
Although concern over the representation issue was expressed repeatedly to the
commission, it is clear that its members never understood how significant that concern
was. Proposals that more women or blacks or neighborhood or regional representatives
or small businessmen be appointed to the new agency were often dismissed by citing
the impossibility of representing every interest on a public agency. When, in late May,
the governor used his appointments to reappoint members of the existing commission
and the legislative leaders appointed themselves to the new commission, it was easy for
voters to conclude that the planning group either had not heard the expressions of
concern or had rejected them. The commission, in short, was perceived to be either
insensitive or hostile to the interests of the average person, and with essentially un-
changed membership, could be expected to be equally hostile or insensitive in the
future. Unattached to accountable political institutions and unwilling to become sym-
bolically attached to a more broadly defined public, the commission fell victim to its
own elitism.
How are these remarkable strategic choices to be explained? How could a group of
experienced and sensible individuals seek to gain public approval by proposing to
increase taxes in order to spend a great deal of money for programs that could not be
easily explained, programs that were to be administered by a tiny, nonelective body
composed largely of bankers, big businessmen, and a few politicians? One answer,
surely plausible, is that the SDC simply didn't pay much attention to political strategy.
Caught up in the pressure and excitement of developing an imaginative set of pro-
posals, it simply overlooked the political dimensions of its mission, perhaps because of
the belief (or hope) that a good plan would sell itself. Commission members have
admitted as much, and their surprise at the political uproar caused by appointments to
the new commission also suggests a certain lack of political sensitivity. However plau-
sible it may seem, though, inattention to political strategy is ultimately unsatisfying as
an explanation, since inattention must itself be explained. How, then, can we account
for the failure of the SDC to be more attentive to its own political requirements?
One important answer, we think, lies in the political residue that formed part of the
context in which the commission worked and that obviously influenced its proposals.
Rhode Island has had a long history of bitter labor-management relations; even today,
it holds the unenviable record of the longest continuous strike against a manufacturer
in recent U.S. history. Strikers' benefits were a powerful symbol of this intransigent
mood, causing employers to be angry over the use of their contributions to prolong
work stoppages; providing workers with an imagined protection against being pushed
around by employers; and causing a large segment of the state's elite to feel concern
over a state image as a "bad place to do business." Members of the SDC shared this
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concern and sought to craft a document that could combat this image by announcing to
investors in the rest of the country that a major change had occurred in Rhode Island
and that the Greenhouse Compact would provide evidence of that change.
For a small state to make a significant impact on the national business community, a
big idea was necessary; hence the comprehensiveness of the Compact, the voluminous
documentation, and the very expensive price tag. Indeed, early promotional material
for the Compact suggested (without any obvious foundation) that two dollars of private
investment would be generated by every public dollar spent, producing a total invest-
ment for economic growth of $750 million, rather than only $250 million. In a real
sense, therefore, the problem to which the Compact was addressed was not so much
economic growth but a perceived national image, and the audience to which the Com-
pact was addressed was not Rhode Island at all, but the national business elite. In
reaching out for national impact, the commission apparently neglected its Rhode Island
base.
Offering a plan aimed at a national audience to a Rhode Island electorate would have
been difficult even if all the members of the commission had been extremely attentive
to local politics, if only because the size and scope of the plan appeared to violate
widely accepted norms of the appropriate scale of any form of political action. Rhode
Island is a small place, dominated by what Elmer Cornwell and Jay Goodman have
described as a "politics of intimacy," in which politicians are expected to develop a
first-name familiarity with their constituents.16 Citizens, in turn, take an obvious pride
in using first names when addressing U.S. senators, congressmen and congresswomen,
governors, and other public officials. In this intimate context, the Greenhouse Com-
pact, developed by technocrats from national business organizations and financial
institutions, staffed by a consulting firm with an international clientele, seemed out of
scale and out of place, reflecting values wholly out of touch with the personalized
localism of the state's residents. Among the voters we interviewed, the longer the
length of residence in Rhode Island, the more likely it was that citizens opposed the
Compact. Legislators reflected these sentiments against the size of the plan when they
reduced its scope several months before the election. From this point of view, whether
or not the Compact was a good plan was irrelevant. It was simply the wrong plan for
an electorate accustomed to less grandiose and more personalized presentations.
Popular preferences for smaller and more personalized policies in Rhode Island are
not necessarily different from popular preferences in other states. Economic-develop-
ment proposals offered to voters elsewhere have been far less comprehensive and less
expensive than the Greenhouse Compact, and they have been included on ballots that
offered other issues for citizens to consider. Modest in size and related to other policy
questions, such proposals are easily perceived as incremental rather than radical ad-
justments. The Greenhouse Compact, however, was a "big" plan that promised a
thorough overhaul of the state's economy through the infusion of thousands of new
high-tech jobs. Moreover, the Compact stood alone, isolated from other policy matters
and most state politicians in a separate referendum that exaggerated its costs and aspi-
rations. In this sense, the plan was both too big and too radical, alienating even poten-
tial beneficiaries, such as workers who feared they would not quality for the new jobs.
What Rhode Island voters may have demonstrated, therefore, was not so much opposi-
tion to economic planning as discomfort with radical change. Like voters in other
states, Rhode Islanders reaffirmed the classic American preference for incremental
rather than comprehensive policymaking. **>
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